

## Global development of HPAI during the last two years.

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IABS

22nd October 2024

# Key developments in HPAI epidemiology since Oct 22

- Exceptional global spread; panzootic most continents affected
- High infection pressure
  - Increased spread to domestic birds
  - High environmental contamination
  - Exposure to greater range of species of wild bird
- Mammalian infections: spillover to scavengers, some M2M transmission
- Dairy cattle infection in USA: sustained transmission non respiratory, back spill to domestic birds
- H5 HPAI virus evolving with high fitness traits
- Antigenically clade 2.3.4.4b moderately stable

# Global impact of HPAI

**Table 1. Impact of a widening of bird-bird flu**  
(% change in GDP, relative to the baseline)

	Bird-bird <sup>(a)</sup>
<b>World total</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
<i>High income countries</i>	-0.1
<i>Low &amp; Middle-income countries</i>	-0.4
East Asia and Pacific	-0.4
Europe & Central Asia	-0.4
Latin America & the Caribbean	-0.7
Middle East & North Africa	-0.4
South Asia	-0.4
Sub Saharan Africa	-0.3

*Source*: World Bank.

<sup>(a)</sup> Assumes that 12 percent of domestic birds in each region die from the disease or are killed in efforts to prevent its spread.


57 million birds died/culled  
in last year

\$4bn/pa?


3.4% (range 2.6-4.4%) global  
economy

# Global distribution of Avian Influenza

1<sup>st</sup> October 2021 - 30<sup>th</sup> September 2022




Confirmed Avian influenza events worldwide from 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023




# Global distribution of Avian Influenza

1<sup>st</sup> October 2023- 26<sup>th</sup> September 2024



# Introduction into Central and Latin America



**PAHO**




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 The designations employed and the presentation of the material in these maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the Pan American Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.  
 Map production: PAHO Health Emergencies Department/ Health Emergency Information and Risk Assessment Unit/ GIS Team.



Sources  
 - Data: World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) (2023). Retrieved on 12 May 2023. Data extracted by Pan American Health Organization. Reproduced with permission. WOAH bears no responsibility for the integrity or accuracy of the data contained herein, but not limited to, any deletion, manipulation, or reformatting of data that may have occurred beyond its control  
 - Cartography: WHO Detailed ADM0 Boundaries; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna - Data Service (SHP) Major flyways of Arctic Birds Shapefile Accessed February 2023.


# Global migration rates among the geographic regions of clade 2.3.4.4b (2020-2022)



Fusaro et al High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe—Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict, *Virus Evolution*, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2024, veae027, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veae027>


# Global Avian Influenza Viruses situation

Countries reporting HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 22 May 2024




Source, FAO <https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-with-zoonotic-potential>

# Declining HPAI trend between Oct 2022- Sep 2023 vs Oct 2023 – Sep 2024 Underlying factors?




# Reducing trend of disease burden in last 2 years


## No. outbreaks in poultry - Northern hemisphere




## No. outbreaks in poultry - Southern hemisphere



## No. poultry killed and disposed of reported to WDAH (in millions of heads) - world





## No. wild birds dead reported to WDAH (in thousands of heads) - world



# Transatlantic transmission

Putative transmission pathways between Europe and Newfoundland via migratory waterfowls/shorebirds



■ spring    ■ autumn    H5N1 detected  spring/summer 2021     November 2021



scientific reports

[www.nature.com/scientificreports/](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-28000-8)



Communication  
**Recurring Trans-Atlantic Incursion of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 Viruses by Long Distance Migratory Birds from Northern Europe to Canada in 2022/2023**

Tamiru N. Alkie <sup>1,†</sup>, Alexandra M. P. Byrne <sup>2,4</sup>, Megan E. B. Jones <sup>2,4</sup>, Benjamin C. Mollett <sup>2</sup>, Laura Bourque <sup>3</sup>, Oliver Lung <sup>2</sup>, Joe James <sup>2,5,6</sup>, Carmencita Yason <sup>4</sup>, Ashley C. Banyard <sup>2,5,6</sup>, Daniel Sullivan <sup>1</sup>, Anthony V. Signore <sup>1,3</sup>, Andrew S. Lang <sup>4,6</sup>, Meghan Baker <sup>7</sup>, Beverly Dawe <sup>7</sup>, Ian H. Brown <sup>2,3,4</sup> and Yohannes Berhane <sup>1,4,4,4</sup>

**OPEN** **Transatlantic spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 by wild birds from Europe to North America in 2021**

V. Callando<sup>1,2</sup>, R. S. Lewis<sup>3,4,5</sup>, A. Pohlmann<sup>6,7</sup>, S. B. Ballie<sup>8,9</sup>, A. C. Banyard<sup>10</sup>, M. Beer<sup>11</sup>, J. H. Brown<sup>12</sup>, R. A. M. Fouchier<sup>13</sup>, R. D. E. Hanson<sup>14</sup>, T. R. Lamer<sup>15</sup>, A. S. Lang<sup>16</sup>, S. Laurent<sup>17</sup>, O. Lung<sup>18</sup>, G. Robertson<sup>19</sup>, H. van der Jeugd<sup>20</sup>, T. H. Aldie<sup>21</sup>, K. Thrusfield<sup>22</sup>, M. L. van Toor<sup>23</sup>, J. Waldenström<sup>24</sup>, C. Yason<sup>25</sup>, T. Kuiken<sup>26</sup>, B. Y. Berhane<sup>27</sup>

# Expansion in wild bird host range: susceptibility?

## *Primary hosts: Often highly susceptible*



• Many long distance migratory species may be tolerant to infection with HPAIV in the absence of disease

**Mortality**

## *Secondary hosts: Differential susceptibility*



# Expansion in wild bird host range: susceptibility

## *Tertiary: Medium-Low Susceptibility*



*Occasionally seen to succumb to infection.*

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## *Quaternary: Resistant?*

*Dalmatian  
pelican*



*European  
shag*





# Impacts on biodiversity



# SCIENTIFIC TASK FORCE ON AVIAN INFLUENZA AND WILD BIRDS

STATEMENT - JULY 2023

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9b880198-02d2-4eda-a860-d1a56299bc31/content>



# Mortality in worlds largest breeding colony of Northern Gannets

2020



2022



# Species affected – Wild birds – mortality events

- Africa – Long distance migratory birds and resident birds: e.g. Pelicans, Terns, African penguins



Figure 8. As this outbreak of HPAI in pelicans in Senegal shows, there are challenges in carcass removal but this can be undertaken safely if appropriate PPE is worn and carcasses are disposed of appropriately. Planning for such operations should be built into emergency response plans and developed in 'peacetime'. Image credits: FAO

# Species affected – Wild birds – mortality events

- Asia: Crane species and Spoonbill



# Increased infectivity in effective bridging species?

Charadriiformes: diverse order live near water

Sub group Laridae (gulls, terns, noddies, skimmers, kittiwakes); ubiquitous  
100 species from 22 genera many of which have become infected with H5N1

Genetic changes in virus

High susceptibility and virus shedding


Behavioural; move between habitats (land, sea, remote land masses)

Increasing environmental contamination/exposure (naïve populations)



# Spread to mammals


- Captive bred animals: mink, foxes
- Wild Scavengers; ie foxes, seals, stoat, otter
- Domestic ; cats



American black bear ( <i>Ursus americanus</i> )	Burrelter's porpoise ( <i>Phocoena spinipinnis</i> )	European polecat ( <i>Mustela putorius</i> )	Porpoise ( <i>Phocoena phocoena</i> )
American mink ( <i>Neogale vison</i> )	Caspien seal ( <i>Pusa caspica</i> )	Fennel ( <i>Mustela furo</i> )	Raccoon ( <i>Procyon lotor</i> )
American pine marten ( <i>Martes americana</i> )	Cat ( <i>Felis catus</i> )	Fisher cat ( <i>Pekania pennanti</i> )	Red fox ( <i>Vulpes vulpes</i> )
Amur leopard ( <i>Panthera pardus orientalis</i> )	Chilean dolphin ( <i>Cephalorhynchus eutropis</i> )	Grey seal ( <i>Halichoerus grypus</i> )	Skunk ( <i>Mephitis mephitis</i> )
Amur tiger ( <i>Panthera tigris</i> )	Common dolphin ( <i>Delphinus delphi</i> )	Harbour seal ( <i>Phoca vitulina</i> )	South America fur seal ( <i>Arctophoca australis</i> )
Asiatic black bear ( <i>Ursus thibetanus</i> )	Coyote ( <i>Canis latrans</i> )	Japanese raccoon dog ( <i>Nyctereutes viverrinus</i> )	South American bush dogs ( <i>Speothos venaticus</i> )
Bobcat ( <i>Lynx rufus</i> )	Dog ( <i>Canis familiaris</i> )	Kodiak grizzly bear ( <i>Ursus arctos horribilis</i> )	South American sea lion ( <i>Otaria flavescens</i> )
Beech marten ( <i>Martes foina</i> )	Eurasian badger ( <i>Meles meles</i> )	Marine otter ( <i>Lontra felina</i> )	Virginia opossum ( <i>Didelphis virginiana</i> )
Bottlenose dolphin ( <i>Tursiops truncatus</i> )	Eurasian lynx ( <i>Lynx lynx</i> )	Mountain lion ( <i>Puma concolor</i> )	White-sided dolphin ( <i>Lagenorhynchus acutus</i> )
Brown bear ( <i>Ursus arctos</i> )	Eurasian otter ( <i>Lutra lutra</i> )	North American river otter ( <i>Lontra canadensis</i> )	Pig ( <i>Sus scrofa</i> )

# H5 detections: Expanded host range

Timeline of number of outbreaks of HPAI from 2020 to present



# HPAI in mammals - impact on biodiversity

## Mass mortality events (biodiversity)

More than **51,000** mammals died in South America (Oct-22 Nov-23)




*More than 10,000 dead South American sea lions in Peru*



# Reporting by mammal category October 2023 – September 2024


Number of countries/territories reporting HPAI cases



- **Companion animals** : cats and dogs
- **Farmed fur-bearing mammals** : 4 species (*American mink, Arctic fox, raccoon dog, sable*)
- **Marine mammals** : 4 species (*Antarctic fur seal, South American fur seal, South American sea lion, Southern elephant seal*)
- **Other domestic mammals** : 3 species (*alpaca, bovine, goat*)
- **Terrestrial wild mammals**: 13 species (e.g. raccoon, red fox, Eurasian otter)


# Semi-aquatic mammals in South America

## Mammal to mammal transmission



# Spread to Antarctica

OFFLU ad-hoc group on HPAI H5 in wildlife of South America and Antarctica (2023) Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region.



Separate introductions into South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and Falkland islands; spread to shelf



Brown skua



Kelp gull



Antarctic tern



South Georgia shag



Antarctic fur seal



Southern elephant seal

## Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Suspected in penguins and shags on the Antarctic Peninsula and West Antarctic Coast

Fabiola León, Cécile Le Bohec, Eduardo J. Pizarro, Loicks Ballo, Robin Croisier, Aymeric Huetlin, Daniel P. Zitterbart, Gonzalo Barriga, Elie Pozio, Julia A. Viana  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.03.16.585360>

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review (what does this mean?)



Abstract Full Text Info/History Photos

Preview PDF

nature communications

Article

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-05190-8>

## Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region

Received: 23 November 2023


Accepted: 8 August 2024

Published online: 13 September 2024

Ashley C. Banyard<sup>1,2</sup>, Ashley Dennison<sup>3</sup>, Alexander M. P. Byrne<sup>1,4</sup>, Scott M. Reid<sup>5</sup>, Joshua G. Lynton-Jenkins<sup>1,2</sup>, Benjamin Moloni<sup>1</sup>, Dilhani De Silva<sup>6</sup>, Jacqui Peers-Dent<sup>1</sup>, Kim Finlayson<sup>7</sup>, Rosamund Hall<sup>8</sup>, Freya Brockley<sup>9</sup>, Marcia Blyth<sup>2</sup>, Marco Falchini<sup>1</sup>, Zoe Fowler<sup>8</sup>, Elaine M. Fitzcharles<sup>2</sup>, Ian H. Brown<sup>1,2</sup> & Joe James<sup>1,2</sup>

# Outbreaks in captive bred mammals

Spain ; Oct 22 outbreak in mink farm (52k)



HA gene



Limited adaptive changes in the virus (T271A) in the PB2 gene

Montserrat et al (<https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2023.28.3.2300001>)




# Companion animals: H5 HPAI

- H5N1 HPAI infections in cats have been widely reported
- Variable clinical manifestations, including respiratory and neurological signs, often fatal outcomes.
- Infection via exposure to infected birds, other animals, contaminated feed or in the milking parlour!
- Captivity die offs ie Large cats in zoos
- Dogs susceptible
- Very infrequent reports



# The virus driving the impact!



The 2021-24 H5N1 HPAI is the most infectious and dangerous of strains to date


Multiple evolved traits

# Virological explanations for the unprecedented 2021-present H5N1 epidemic



1. Acquisition of N1 NA conferred fitness in ducks and wild birds

but possibly not fitness in chickens due to long stalk



2. Increased fitness in wild birds enabled multiple reassortment events to acquire optimized internal gene constellation


3. Mutations in H5 HA restored thermostability but it remains specific for  $\alpha$ 2,3 sialic acid

**Contemporary H5N1 viruses have enhanced fitness to infect, transmit and persist in birds, but remain un-adapted to humans.**



# H5N1 HPAI viruses have enhanced survival kinetics in the environment


- $D_t$  is time taken in days for a 90% reduction in viral infectivity, (a 1  $\log_{10}$  decrease) at temperature t.
- Survival of H5N1-2021 at 4°C is 43.2 days dose adjusted



- H5N1-2021 at 4°C  $D_4$  of 9.5 days ( $R^2$  0.93, to 6 weeks)  $X=0$  at 43.2 days
- H5N1-2021 at 20°C  $D_{20}$  of 4.5 days ( $R^2$  0.87, to 3 weeks)  $X=0$  at 17.2 days
- H5N1-2021 at 30°C  $D_{30}$  of 2.3 days ( $R^2$  0.88, to 2 weeks)  $X=0$  at 8.7 days

Warren et al (2024) Assessment of Survival Kinetics for Emergent Highly Pathogenic Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx Avian Influenza Viruses. Viruses 2024, 16, 889. <https://doi.org/10.3390/v16060889>

# Genetic analysis of Gs/Gd A(H5) sequences



Monitoring viral spread: Collaboration with multi-national laboratories and institutions


Introductions into continents through long range migratory birds

Maintenance and secondary spread of the virus in poultry populations and resident wild birds


Occasional spillover into mammals

Occasional spillover into humans

# Extensive genetic heterogeneity: large genotype diversity in Europe



First wave  
(2020-2021)



Second wave  
(2021-2022)




Volume 10, Issue 1  
2024  
(In Progress)

**High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe—Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict**

Alice Fusaro, Bianca Zecchini, Edoardo Gussani, Elisa Palumbo, Montserrat Agüero-García, Claudia Bachofen, Adam Bálint, Feereshah Banihashem, Ashley C Banyard, Nancy Beerens ... Show more

Author Notes

Virus Evolution, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2024, veae027,



# Further genetic heterogeneity in the America's




Virology  
Volume 537, October 2021, 109860




## H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b in wild and domestic birds: Introductions into the United States and reassortments, December 2021–April 2022

Sungsu Youk<sup>a,\*</sup>, Mia Kim Torchetti<sup>b</sup>, Kristina Lantz<sup>b</sup>, Julianna B. Lemoch<sup>c</sup>, Mary Lea Killian<sup>b</sup>, Christina Leyson<sup>d</sup>, Sarah N. Bevins<sup>e</sup>, Krista Dillione<sup>f</sup>, Han S. Jo<sup>g</sup>, David E. Stallone<sup>h</sup>, Rebecca L. Poulson<sup>h</sup>, David I. Suarez<sup>h</sup>, David E. Swayne<sup>h</sup>, Mary J. Pantin-Jackwood<sup>h</sup>,



# Iterative reassortment drove the emergence and propagation of the H5N1 panzootic



Peacock et al, 2024 (Figure credit Martha Nelson and David VanInsberghe)

# Future changes in the H5 viruses

Immune pressure in an exposed recovered population will shape virus selection

Immune escape variants of the virus which carry a 'fitness' for host population can persist and spread

In time will carry a selection advantage of previous epizootic strains  
The contribution of prior immunity to all influenza A viruses is not understood




# Why are wild birds spreading less virus?

- Immunity is building in the population ie 3-4 years
  - Immune birds less susceptible and shed less virus
  - Less virus being shed into the environment
  - Less virus to find its way through farm defences
  - If the virus devises a way to escape wild bird immunity
- = NEW EPIDEMIC STRAIN
- Continued close monitoring required in naïve and vaccinated populations to assess any changes in virus; relevance for vaccine strain selection

# Spread of H5N1 HPAI to dairy cattle


# H5N1 HPAI dairy cattle outbreak 10<sup>th</sup> March 2024 to present



## Cases 300/14 states



# Dairy cattle; infection and epidemiology


- Single spill over of H5N1 HPAI (B3.13 genotype)
- Initial signs are drop in feed intake and milk output
- Mastitis
- Symptoms range from asymptomatic to lethal
- Viral load in milk can be very high
- Almost exclusively lactating cows
- More in older animals
  
- Replication largely in mammary gland
- Respiratory infection at best transient
  
- Spread pathways mechanical ie via fomite, or movement of infected animals but high uncertainties





# Genetic characteristics of H5N1 in dairy cattle

Nguyen et al bioRxiv <https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.05.01.591751>; t





# Dairy cattle epidemic; implications for poultry?

- Dairy farms often close proximity to poultry
- Poorer biosecurity practices
- Shared personnel/household contacts between sectors
- Cattle virus whilst replicating in mammary gland phenotypically avian
- Fully infectious for domestic birds
  - Human cases; mild
- No evidence to date for spill over into wild birds of dairy cattle B3.13 virus
- Infection confined to USA
- Reduction of threat from cattle via vaccination?



- Field Studies with Nonviable, Non-replicating Veterinary Vaccines Targeting Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Livestock


<https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/program-update/cvb-notice-24-13-field-studies-nonviable-non-replicating-veterinary-vaccines>

# Human case summary associated with dairy cattle epidemic (16/10/24)

State	Cattle	Poultry	Unknown	State Total
California	6	0	0	6
Colorado	1	9	0	10
Michigan	2	0	0	2
Missouri	0	0	1	1
Texas	1	0	0	1
Source Total	10	9	1	20









Pasteurisation kills live virus in the milk



[https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html?CDC\\_AA\\_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fbird-flu%2Fphp%2Favian-flu-summary%2Findex.html](https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fbird-flu%2Fphp%2Favian-flu-summary%2Findex.html)

# Do the cattle and goat H5N1 viruses pose risk to humans?



**Cattle and goat H5N1 viruses retain affinity for avian-like receptor analogue 3SLN.**

# Do the cattle and goat H5N1 viruses pose risk to humans?




pH stability

Cattle

Goat

Control




pH 5.9



Optimum pH fusion  
for human cells: <5.5

Optimum pH fusion  
for Avian cells: >5.5

pH 6.0




Cattle and goat H5N1 viruses retained avian-like phenotype and showed membrane fusion at pH5.9.

# Have the viruses changed antigenically in last two years :relevance for vaccines?



Year	Clade	Subtype	Region	Subtype Clade	Subtype									
					H5N1	H5N1	H5N1	H5N1	H5N1	H5N1	H5N3	H5N3	H5N1	
					1	2.2	2.3.4	2.3.2.1a	2.3.2.1c	2.3.2.1c/g	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b
					1	2.2	2.3.4	2.3.2.1a	2.3.2.1c	2.3.2.1c/g	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		4.8	4.8	5.6	3.9	2.7	7.5	6.6	7.2		
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		6.3	6.4	7.2	5.0	3.8	8.3	7.5	8.0		
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		5.3	4.8	5.8	2.9	2.3	7.3	6.5			
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		4.5	3.9	4.6	2.5	1.1	4.9	4.0			
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		5.1	5.1	5.3	5.5	4.1	1.1	0	1.1		
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		5.9	5.9	6.5	5.4	3.3	3.7	3	2.8		
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		6.2	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.2	2.0	2	2.9		
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		6.0	6.3	6.9	6.0	3.7	4.0	3	4.7		
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		4.8	4.9	5.5	4.3	2.0	4.3	3.5	4.3	3.1	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.1	5.7	6.1	6.0	3.6	4.0	3.3	5.1	2.6	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		4.7	4.9	5.4	4.8	2.6	3.4	2.6	3.8	2.2	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.0	5.3	5.7	5.7	3.7	2.4	1.7	3.6	1.1	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.2	5.5	5.9	5.8	3.8	2.3	1.7	3.5	1.2	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.3	5.7	5.5	3.5	2.4	1.7	3.4	1.2	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.1	5.7	4.9	3.0	2.8	2.1	3.0	1.8	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.7	4.8	5.1	5.3	3.7	1.5	0.7	2.4	0.7	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.5	5.8	6.2	5.9	3.9	2.6	2.0	3.6	1.5	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.9	5.0	5.4	5.2	3.4	2.0	1.3	2.6	1.1	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.3	5.8	5.2	3.1	3.1	2.4	3.7	1.9	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.1	5.4	5.6	4.0	1.3	0.6	2.5	0.6	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.9	5.1	5.5	5.2	3.2	2.4	1.7	3.2	1.3	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.4	5.8	5.6	3.5	2.7	2.0	3.8	1.4	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.1	5.3	5.5	4.1	1.1	0.6	1.9	1.1	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.3	5.7	5.6	3.7	2.1	1.4	3.1	1.0	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.3	5.4	5.8	5.2	3.3	2.6	2.0	3.1	1.7	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.5	4.6	4.9	5.2	3.6	1.5	0.7	2.3	0.8	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	South Asia		4.6	4.4	4.9	4.3	2.7	2.6	1.8	2.3	1.8	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Southeast Asia		4.8	4.4	4.7	4.7	3.9	2.2	1.9	0.9	2.4	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Southeast Asia		4.9	5.5	5.6	6.2	4.2	2.1	1.5	3.8	0.8	
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N5	Europe		5.6	5.7	6.1	5.5	3.6	2.6	2.0	3.2	1.7	

'Relatively' stable given established across the world



# Multiple clades circulating; antigenic heterogeneity

- Despite transmission between hosts dominant 2.3.4.4b relatively stable
- Host specific adaptive changes not altering antigenic phenotype YET!
- Variation on how each host see's virus antigenically?
- Creates an environment for ease of vaccine strain selection
  - Regional variations
  - Multiple clades = multivalent

# Key Conclusions

- Exceptional global spread; panzootic most continents affected
  - Continues to be a significant threat to biodiversity
- High infection pressure resulting in increased wild bird host range and continuing if not declining cases in domestic birds
- Mammalian infections: spillover to scavengers, some M2M transmission
- Dairy cattle infection in USA: continuing outbreak with spread (14 states); **vaccination in future?**
- H5 HPAI virus evolving with high fitness traits
- Antigenically clade 2.3.4.4b moderately stable
  
- **Vaccination remains an important tool for prevention/control in some countries/regions**

# Acknowledgements



- OFFLU AIM project team (APHA, IZSVe)
- Ash Banyard, Joe James and Caroline Warren, APHA
- Lina Awada, WOAH for some graphics
- International partners sharing data



# Thank you for your attention



Passion  
Reliability  
Innovation  
Dignity  
Excellence

Preventing and controlling viral diseases

Ian.Brown@pirbright.ac.uk

90<sup>th</sup> General Session | World Assembly | GS  
World Organisation for Animal Health | Paris, 21-25 May 2023



## Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) virus events in animals and people

Assessment based on data as of 18 July 2024

14 August 2024

### Key points

At the present time, based on available information, FAO-WHO-WOAH assess the global public health risk of influenza A(H5N1) viruses to be low, while the risk of infection for occupationally exposed persons is low to moderate depending on the risk mitigation measures in place. Transmission between animals continues to occur and, to date, a limited number of human infections have been reported. Although additional human infections associated with exposure to infected animals or contaminated environments are likely to continue to occur, the overall public health impact of such infections at a global level is minor.



**Resolution 28:**  
**Strategic Challenges in the Global Control of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza**



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## Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) virus events in animals and people

14 August 2024 | Emergency Situational Updates



Global strategy for the prevention and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (2024-2033)

[www.pirbright.ac.uk](http://www.pirbright.ac.uk)